The present study involves an analysis of the two main normative approaches and intellectual traditions in competition law: the consequentialist and the deontological. The aim is to evaluate their merit in the application of positive law. Especially, this paper examines whether the traditional approaches offer a full account of the underpinning rationale of Article 102 TFEU and whether CJEU jurisprudence reflects a single intellectual tradition. Furthermore, three main legal tests are brought under scrutiny. These legal tests are invoked by the CJEU, in order to determine whether an infringement of Article 102 has occurred. The tests are associated with the abovementioned normative approaches. The scrutiny of the tests seeks to demonstrate the advantages and disadvantages of each normative approach in specific settings. The argument presented by the current analysis is that the two main normative approaches attempt to be holistic and reduce competition law to a single objective or goal. This produces serious shortcomings. Thus, it is preferable to adopt a value pluralistic normative theory aiming at creating a framework, which accommodates both consequentialist and deontological reasoning, when it is objectively justified. In terms of methodology, the argument is unravelled in a top-down method: first, it is presented on an abstract, theoretical level (Part C) and second, the rationale and application of Article 102 are examined so as to assess the general assumptions made in the first part (Parts D and E).
rigid hierarchical prioritisation among EUCL's objectives. 12 Therefore, it seeks to provide a framework which accommodates all the objectives of EUCL and encompasses both consequentialist and deontological reasoning when it is objectively justified. In that respect, it aims at informing the legal hermeneutics of EUCL and facilitating the settlement of the adjudication problem.
To assess the merit of the above normative approaches in relation to the adjudication problem, a top-down method is adopted. 13 This involves a type of deductive reasoning, which starts from general assumptions, and, subsequently, narrows down to specific settings. 14 The specific observations are used to confirm or reject the theoretical assumptions.
In the first part, the two main normative approaches with regard to the conceptual foundations of EUCL are compared. In addition, the contours of the value pluralistic approach are drawn in general terms. The second part is devoted to the analysis of Article 102 TFEU (Article 102). Article 102 is used as a case study to evaluate the merit or demerit of the abovementioned normative approaches. The analytical exercise is twofold: first, it assesses whether the traditional approaches offer a full account of the underpinning rationale of Article 102; second, CJEU jurisprudence is scrutinised to determine whether a single objective motivates the Courts' judgments.
The third part delves into an investigation of the three main legal tests, which the CJEU has invoked, in order to determine whether an infringement of Article 102 has occurred. 15 Each test is associated with a normative approach in CompL discourse. The asefficient-competitor test (AECT) 16 and the consumer harm test (CHT) 17 are interrelated with the "effects-based approach" and incorporate consequentialist thinking. On the contrary, the test of intent (ToI) induces certain deontological thinking in the legal analysis of "abuse".
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Concluding that the so-called holistic approaches cannot fully guide the interpretation and the 12 Abayomi Al-Ameen, 'Antitrust pluralism and justice' in D Zimmer (ed), application of Article 102, the paper suggests that a first step towards a value pluralistic approach of EUCL should be made.
B. NORMATIVE THEORIES IN EUCL
EUCL should not merely be an empirically formed set of ad hoc rules aiming at settling individual cases but rather a coherent and principled field of law. In this part, the paper considers how the two main normative approaches of EUCL address this problem. After presenting their salient features, it highlights that their incompleteness stems from their struggle to be holistic. The third section presents certain arguments for endorsing value pluralism and offers a general outline of its potential contribution to judicial decision-making.
The Consequentialist Approach
The topos of the consequentialist approach is that a normative standard should be evaluated exclusively depending on its consequences. 19 It follows that an institution is justified as long as it achieves the greatest net balance of satisfaction for all individuals under its scope. 20 In
CompL discourse, consequentialist thinking implies that the value of competition derives from its welfare maximising properties. 21 Competition, like every other economic institution, is protected because it increases the welfare of society. 22 Thus, EUCL should be instrumentalised for enhancing total or consumer welfare without having value per se. 23 This view has become the current orthodoxy, since an increasing number of economists, practitioners, scholars and authorities suggest that economic efficiency should be the ultimate goal of CompL.
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Total welfare is defined as the sum of producer and consumer surplus in a given industry. 25 This standard is related to the obsolete model of perfect competition, which the neoclassical economics postulate. 26 Being based on a purely theoretical and heavily Total welfare is construed, by some authors, in a broad sense as including not only economic welfare but also values such as justice, fairness and other public goods. 39 However, if such a definition of welfare is adopted, the consequentialist approach will be transformed into value pluralism, as will be shown below. This also contradicts the main theme of the welfarist approaches, according to which even non-economic welfare goals can be described in wellbeing terms.
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The alternative to total welfare, as many commentators argue is that the objective of
CompL should be to prohibit behaviour that reduces consumer welfare. 41 The main objection this standard encounters is that there is no specific, substantive reason for evaluating the welfare of consumers as bearing greater weight than that of producers. Moreover, prioritising consumer welfare is not likely to foster an economic approach in CompL and provide us with easier tests regarding the application of economic analysis. 42 In addition, the main argument in favour of the consumer welfare objective derives from its potentially redistributive effect.
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Nonetheless, competition law under such an objective is ill-suited to pursue the redistribution of income, since it would be more efficient to realise distributive justice through the tax and transfer system.
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Moreover, consumer welfare has been used to disguise different objectives and ulterior purposes, thus confusing the debate and creating the false impression of a consensus. 45 Although it was proposed as an instrument to defend economic freedom leading to a "lightweight antitrust", it generated false convictions and unnecessary interventions.
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Consequently, total welfare should be deemed as a superior objective than consumer welfare, since it relies on formal equality of all economic agents and values all economic agents equally. cannot be an all-encompassing objective.
The Deontological Approach
The foundation of the deontological approach is that competition constitutes an end in itself, separate from the outcomes, which may be produced for consumers, economic efficiency, market integration or industrial growth. The process itself contains a significant economic importance and cannot be abolished, even if it is not always the most effective mode to reach welfare maximisation. 55 Consequently, the process of competition should be protected on its own right as a sui generis right.
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The Ordoliberal School holds a prominent role in the deontological tradition. For ordoliberals, freedom is the essence of competition; therefore, its protection should be the principal goal of EUCL. 57 Freedom to compete in a market with undistorted competition is dialectically intertwined with political freedom, namely the capability to participate freely in a fair political game. 58 Likewise, a democratic polity requires and presupposes a free and fair market. 59 The ideal is a social market economy where the rule of law is respected and state intervention aims to protect freedom from being abusively exercised. 60 foundations upon which liberal democracy and the economic constitution are established. 62 Consequently, CompL must impose constraints on the exercise of both state and private power as the political institutions restrain the accumulation of political power. 63 To achieve this, it should be oriented towards the ideal of complete competition, namely, competition in which no firm has power to coerce other firms in the relevant market. 64 Complete competition is articulated under an "as if' standard. According to this standard, where market power cannot be eliminated, the bearer of it "should act as if constrained by competition". 65 In that context, companies should be able to compete with each other and pursue their commercial interests while a strong regulatory framework would limit the capacity of the powerful market players and restrict the state from intervening in a manner distortive of market structure.
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Being principles-based, the deontological approach addresses the question of whether an action is right or wrong. 67 It contends that a conduct can be right regardless of its consequences. Its correctness stems from its compatibility with a rule. Therefore, the deontological approach is grounded on value judgements and induces moral reasoning and evaluations in the discipline of CompL. The main objection against the deontological approach is that, since it values the competitive process irrespective of its consequences to the social welfare, it ignores economic analysis thus resulting in inflexible dogmatism. 68 Once a commercial practice is categorised as impeding competition, its distortive effect on the market will be implied, without any ad hoc analysis.
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It would appear that competition, as an economic phenomenon, could be better understood through the language of economics. 70 Certainly, economic concepts, as soon as they enter into the province of law, become part of it. 71 Nevertheless, it cannot be argued that any form of deontological thinking denies efficiency considerations based on sound economic tools. 72 In addition, the deontological approach engages in a different form of practical reasoning in comparison to the consequentialist approach. These elements are necessary for the application of the law. 73 For instance, practical reasoning may restore the necessary link between legal categorisations and effects. Moreover, it highlights the importance of value judgements in EUCL discourse, providing a comprehensive justification for judicial decisions. For these reasons, the Court has developed, in many cases, an institutional conception of freedom and a comprehensive notion of fairness.
Furthermore, the deontological approach promotes an essential component of legal thinking: categorical thinking. 74 Categorisation may ensure legal certainty and reduce enforcement costs. It may also enable the interpreter of the law to distinguish which evidence is relevant in each case. For this purpose, categories should rely on empirical evidence and the moral and legal principles inherent in law. Undoubtedly, these categories should be subject to revision according to economic theory. 75 On this account, completely diminishing the importance of the deontological approach might prove destructive for the application of EUCL.
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Beyond the Holistic Approaches: Value Pluralism
Since the two main normative theories are not prescriptive enough to provide adequate guidelines for decision-makers and interpreters, a paradigm shift is necessary. 77 The starting position of value pluralism is that there is no need for a strict hierarchical prioritisation among EUCL's objectives. 78 objectives. Concisely, protecting the undistorted competitive process for the benefit of the consumers should be held as the underpinning rationale of Article 102. As a result, the limits imposed on the unilateral conduct of a dominant undertaking by Article 102 should aim to protect the market structure and the competition as a process, so as to avoid consumer harm.
Therefore, the multitude of objectives which constitute the underpinning rationale of Article 102 lead to a pluralistic perspective. Contrary to the holistic approaches, this perspective recognises that the understanding and the coherent application of Article 102 requires a conceptual framework in which both consequentialist and deontological thinking coexist.
Pluralism in CJEU Jurisprudence
It has been illustrated that both the consequentialist and the deontological school of thought cannot wholly explain the current approach concerning the interpretation of Article 102. This section examines whether the CJEU favours the plurality of goals or if the Courts' decisionmaking can be reduced to a single and ultimate objective.
Beyond doubt, the notion of economic efficiency is central to the CJEU reasoning.
Firstly, "dominance" is defined as "a position of economic strength which enables an undertaking to prevent effective competition". 116 Furthermore, any reference to public interest induces a total welfare standard. Restrictions of competition may stem from abusive the CJEU has highlighted that "efficiencies should be taken into consideration under the overall economic assessment of the conduct at hand". 118 In other words, it has to be determined whether the allegedly anti-competitive effect arising from a dominant undertaking's practice can be "outweighed by its advantages in terms of efficiency". 119 Additional support to welfarist approaches is given by the Guidance, which adopts a consumer welfare standard and allows for allegedly anti-competitive conduct to be objectively justified. 120 The Commission's "economic approach" may lean on a consequentialist standard such as "consumer welfare", but undoubtedly, courts and competition authorities are nowhere near adopting this standard as an ultimate objective.
Influenced by ordoliberal thinking, the EU Courts have proclaimed that the "special responsibility" of the dominant undertaking "does not allow its conduct to impair genuine undistorted competition". 121 If anticompetitive effects were the rationale of the said special responsibility, all firms with market power would bear such a responsibility. 122 Market access, equality of opportunity and protection of freedom to compete have also triggered the recognition of such a responsibility. In her Opinion in British Airways, AG Kokott contended that Article 102 "is not designed only or primarily to protect the immediate interests of individual competitors or consumers, but to protect the structure of the market and thus competition as such". 123 Furthermore, in many cases the Court associates individual wellbeing with the single market imperative, highlighting that Article 102 should seek to preserve undistorted competition in the market so as to increase social welfare. 124 In GlaxoSmithKline, the Court utilised the notion of final consumers and consumer choice to restrict a dominant undertaking's freedom to compete and establish a link between restrictions of parallel trade and anti-competitive effects. 125 Therefore, it recognised that market integration and consumer sovereignty might impose certain limitations to economic freedom.
In addition, the principle of fairness has inspired many Court judgments. The CJEU has consistently held that "a system of undistorted competition can be guaranteed only if equality of opportunity is secured among the various economic operators". 126 Additionally, equality of opportunity indicates that as-efficient rivals should be on equal footing in the relevant market. 127 For instance, dominant undertakings should abstain from predation since it is deemed "unfair". 128 By the same token, rebate schemes pursued by a dominant undertaking were found to be abusive when they proved to be unfair to the affected consumers. 
D. ARTICLE 102 UNDER THE MICROSCOPE: THE LEGAL TESTS
In this part, three main tests regarding an infringement of Article 102 are brought under scrutiny. The AECT and the CHT stem from the consequentialist approach. 132 The ToI is grounded on an effects-based test, yet transcending it as it engages in certain deontological thinking. 133 Should a single test be applicable to all conceivable abusive practices, it would be implied that there is indeed an ultimate objective of Article 102 from which the relevant test derives. 134 Thereby, a pluralistic approach will have to be refuted. 135
The As-Efficient-Competitor Test (AECT)
It is a generally accepted idea that by protecting less efficient competitors, there is an unavoidable risk of protecting competitors rather than competition itself. 136 Seeking to avoid such an incident, the CJEU in a series of cases developed the as-efficient-competitor test (AECT). 137 Its rationale is that the most efficient firm should be the competitive winner. 138 Thus, harmful, anti-competitive exclusion should be distinguished from "exclusion" as a result of undistorted competition on the merits. 139 For that purpose, the AECT examines whether a dominant undertaking's conduct constitutes an exclusionary practice by foreclosing from the relevant market an as-efficient rival. 140 Consequently, practices such as tying, bundling or conditional rebates pursued by a dominant undertaking are deemed abusive only if they are capable of such a foreclosure effect.
In AKZO, the Court held that prices above average variable cost (AVC) but below average total cost (ATC) are abusive if they form part of an exclusionary plan that intends to eliminate an equally efficient competitor. 141 In Deutsche Telekom, the Court considered as abusive a dominant undertaking's pricing practice (margin squeeze). According to the Court's reasoning, these practices were capable of a foreclosure effect to the detriment of competition on the merits. 142 In TeliaSonera, the AECT indicated the existence of margin squeeze. Should a dominant firm be unable to offer its retail services other than at a loss, it follows that competitors who are potentially excluded by the relevant practice should be deemed as-efficient.
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By applying the AECT the Court avoided a form-based approach and held that pricing practices, such as conditional rebates, price discrimination, predatory pricing and margin squeeze are not per se exclusionary. These practices should be regarded as abusive only when they are linked to certain anti-competitive effects. The latter are established by demonstrating that an equally efficient competitor is excluded from the market due to the relevant pricing strategy.
The AECT is consistent with the principle of economic freedom. Article 102 is not there to prevent an undertaking from becoming, on its own merits, dominant on the market.
Freedom to compete should, by definition, amount to the exclusion from the market of the less efficient competitor. 144 Whether inefficient companies can actually survive in competition with the efficient ones is a question to which the answer should only be revealed in the course of competition. Moreover, only conduct that constrains the freedom of action of other market actors, without being objectively justified or bringing efficiency gains, should be prohibited as abusive.
Furthermore, the AECT allows a dominant undertaking to benefit from its superior efficiency, while it remains neutral towards all undertakings, distinguishing them solely under the objective criterion of efficiency. Nonetheless, a question of fairness may arise. It can be argued that freedom of market access, which reflects equality of opportunity, should not be protected or prevented on the basis of current efficiency. 145 It is possible for the dominant undertaking to exclude its competitors so as to repudiate them from achieving their minimum efficiency standards. 146 For instance, the costs for a new entrant will most likely be higher than those of the dominant firm until economies of scale are fully achieved. Should the dominant firm in such a market pursue a potentially abusive practice, it may eliminate a new entrant's opportunity to achieve the minimum efficient scale. Thus, the competitor is prevented from becoming as efficient as the dominant firm by the conduct of the latter.
Accordingly, on certain occasions the AECT does not fully realise the principle of fairness and should be complemented by other legal tests.
143 TeliaSonera (n 101), para 43. The AECT deals properly with the incentives problem by adopting the efficiency of the dominant firm as a benchmark. On the one hand, actual and potential competitors, knowing that they can succeed only by advancing superior efficiency than the dominant undertaking, will have a strong incentive to be more efficient than the dominant firm. On the other hand, the dominant firm retains the incentive to increase its efficiency since it is not deterred by an authority's intervention from acting in accordance with its commercial interests.
In addition, achieving adequate legal certainty is considered a significant advantage of the AECT. Dominant firms are able to predict the legality of their conduct, being required to know solely their own cost-structure so as to assess their performance ex ante. 147 However, when applying for conditional and multi-product rebates the AECT insists on additional information regarding the structure of the market. 148 Moreover, the AECT cannot readily be applied to non-price conduct such as tying and bundling, inasmuch as there is no certain way of determining what the counterfactual price would have been.
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As indicated above, the AECT is mainly justified economically on grounds of actual economic welfare. In principle, the short-term welfare effects of the test are deemed to be clear. It allows, for instance, a dominant undertaking to solely offer the rebates which the less-efficient competitor cannot offer. Thereby, the less-efficient competitors are excluded from the market and both total and consumer welfare increase.
Notwithstanding, in particular cases, excluding a less-efficient competitor may be incompatible with social welfare, raising the problem of false negatives. 150 For instance, the entry of a less-efficient rival can improve total welfare in occasions where the gain in allocative efficiency outweighs the harm caused to productive efficiency. 151 Hence, it should be accepted that the AECT cannot provide a unified theory of the assessment of different forms of abuse.
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In certain cases, non-intervention regarding the exclusion of a less-efficient competitor may allow the dominant firm to defend a market position from which a net long- To conclude, the AECT strives to deal with a fundamental contradiction that lies beneath all law in relation to abuse of market power. In other words, it attempts to safeguard rivalry by curtailing it. As demonstrated above, this test can be under-inclusive and overinclusive, allowing certain false positives and false negatives. As a result, it does not always contribute to welfare maximisation. Furthermore, in some instances it is not fully satisfactory from a fairness perspective, while at the same time, the legal certainty it provides can be called into question. Whilst it is inappropriate as the sole and single test for exclusionary abuses, it remains a useful test.
The Consumer Harm Test (CHT)
The CHT is an effects-balancing test which focuses on the consequences of the conduct on total or consumer welfare. Its salient assumption is that consumer harm can be caused by maintaining or strengthening market power and subsequently by raising prices or restricting output. 155 Under this standard, an exclusionary conduct violates EUCL in case it diminishes competition without fully offsetting these potential adverse effects. 156 Accordingly, an exclusionary conduct should be deemed abusive as long as it does not fully benefit consumers. 157 Hence, the CHT makes illegal any conduct by which a dominant undertaking strengthens its market position causing net harm to consumers. 159 This entails a comparison between a current and a hypothetical situation. Moreover, economists' ability to accurately measure the net consumer-welfare effects of particular conduct and judges' ability to evaluate this evidence are confined by certain limitations. 160 Since dynamic effects are often difficult to assess, the CHT may lead courts to focus too much on static, short-run consumer effects.
Even if the relative short-term economic effects are evaluated, there could not be an accurate economic assessment of the long-term effects on innovation and risk-taking. 161 At the same time, it would be difficult for firms to predict whether their conduct violated Article 102.
Be that as it may, a total welfare standard dictates adopting CHT. In a wellfunctioning market, it can be expected that firms will pass on their lower costs to consumers through lower prices, better services or investment in research and development. Nonetheless, the administrative difficulties of a CHT may reduce a dominant firm's incentives to engage in pro-competitive practices. It should be highlighted that the standard of proof for establishing consumer harm is relatively low; it is not required to prove the existence of an actual or a direct consumer detriment. 162 Consequently, it may lead dominant firms to abandon conduct that would generate efficiencies and be beneficial to total welfare in the long run.
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Therefore, the over-deterrence effect of the test subjects it to false positives. Nevertheless, under the CHT a dominant firm may attempt to objectively justify its conduct by suggesting that it generates efficiencies which outweigh the harm to consumers. 164 Conversely, it is rather difficult for the defendant to establish objective justifications and thereby outweigh the anticompetitive effects.
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On the other hand, reinforcing the standard of proof in the application of the CHT may give rise to systematic false acquittals and under-deterrence. 166 That being the case, it will become very difficult for the claimant to establish consumer harm and, subsequently, the 158 In EUCL the concept of 'consumers' is tantamount to 'customers', since it encompasses all direct or indirect users of the products affected by the conduct: see Guidance (n 97), para 19. 159 Melamed (n 133) 379-388. 160 test will ex ante incentivise dominant firms to engage in anti-competitive conduct. To avoid false negatives an enhanced dominance threshold should be required. 167 Adopting such a standard implies that exploitative abuses are be committed only by a monopolist or quasimonopolist. 168 In conclusion, given its open-ended nature as an effects-balancing test and its inherent unpredictability, the CHT cannot be the general test for analysing conduct under Article 102.
By the same token, the CHT has been reasonably criticised as being over-inclusive and overdeterrent. In cases where the standard of proof of consumer harm is high and its application becomes exacting, the test tends to produce false acquittals and under-deterrence. 169 Moreover, if its scope is limited to short-run consumer effects, it may ultimately harm, rather than benefit, consumers. 170 All things considered, the CHT cannot be the single test for finding an infringement of Article 102. It should be complemented by the other legal tests and supported by the residual values of EUCL. Integrated in such a framework, the CHT may offer optimal results.
The Element of Intent
The Test of Intent (ToI) introduces a form of categorical thinking onto the application of Article 102. More importantly, the ToI recognises the limits of a purely consequentialist approach and attempts to complement any assessment of the effects of a conduct. 171 The ToI asks whether the behaviour in question is irrational "but for" its capability of eliminating or lessening competition". 172 Additionally, when evidence of economic effects is dubious, the element of intent clarifies whether the conduct has an anti-competitive purpose or is aligned with competition on its merits.
The first objection to the ToI is that an anti-competitive intent can be readily confused with the intent to succeed in the market. 173 This raises the risk of false positives. 174 Such a criticism is based on the fact that competitive and exclusionary behaviour may seem similar. 175 In that respect, it presupposes that intent is a subjective element of the conduct itself. Nevertheless, if that were the case the ToI would be incompatible with EUCL since, pursuant to well-established CJEU jurisprudence, abuse is an "objective concept". 176 Furthermore, should a court find an infringement of Article 102 solely based on the state of mind of the perpetrator, that would trespass our legal intuitions, according to which no one should be punished for their evil intention. 177 Hence, intent should be judged only after the aim, the context, the means, and the effects of the conduct in question have been thoroughly assessed. In order to be relevant, evidence of intent must relate to the intention to engage in conduct that does not fall within the scope of competition on the merits.
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For that purpose, ToI is established through a profit sacrifice test, which indicates whether or not a dominant undertaking's conduct makes economic sense. 179 The profit sacrifice test appraises a dominant firm's behaviour as abusive if it sacrifices profits or incurs losses to an extent that would not make economic sense but for eliminating or excluding its rivals from the relevant market. 180 This test is used especially for identifying predatory pricing as long as "predation in any meaningful sense cannot exist, unless there is a temporary sacrifice of net revenues in the expectation of greater future gains". 181 This test was adopted by the Court in AKZO where it was held that pricing above AVC but below ATC is to be considered abusive "only if prices at that level are determined as part of a plan for eliminating a competitor". 182 Furthermore, the ToI may assist in reducing false convictions when objective data have proved inadequate for the finding of an infringement and an additional element is necessary to affirm anti-competitiveness. In other words, the ToI attempts to grasp the incentives and purposes of the dominant firm and examine the relation between them and the means engaged in their realisation. 183 As an example, evidence of a deliberate plan to eliminate an efficient competitor can play a role in cases where a cost test is insufficient to establish a prima facie predation. 184 Thus, in fact, intent as a supplementary element of an anti-competitive practice guards against the risk of false convictions and over-deterrence. 185 Another objection against the ToI is that it allows for false negatives. However, this argument cannot be accepted since intent is an objective notion relying on facts used to complement other empirical tests. This may be elucidated if we examine the practice of tying.
Due to the severe uncertainty of counterfactual type tests in cases of tying, the CHT should be considered an inadequate test. Particularly, it is very difficult to prove that tying raises prices or restricts output. 186 The investigation with regard to the foreclosure effect conducted by the Court has been insufficient. An additional element was required to reason its findings. 187 In Tetra Pak II, for instance, the Court held that the relevant firm intended to make the tying product wholly dependent on the tied, which thereby amounted to a foreclosure effect. 188 Undoubtedly, intent plays a key role in determining whether a tying practice is anti-competitive, since it allows the Court to take into account the overall strategy of the dominant firm. It is also induced so as to establish a capability of market foreclosure.
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Likewise, many scholars argue that a recoupment requirement should be a necessary element of the test, thus minimising the risk of false convictions. 190 Following that, proof of intent may complement the shortcomings of other tests. As demonstrated above, the AECT may diminish effective competitive constraints and deprive a less efficient competitor of the opportunity to become an equally efficient one. In such a situation, evidence of a deliberate plan to exclude a competitor would in itself indicate that this competitor operates as an effective constraint on the dominant undertaking.
Be that as it may, it can still be argued that unintended practices that have a harmful effect on competition can be economically explained. As a result, these practices will not be prohibited under such a standard. 191 Moreover, the profit sacrifice test may not be suitable in effects, making some rather no economic sense. 192 Similarly, not all types of abuse involve a profit sacrifice. For instance, raising a rival's costs could not be prohibited under a profitsacrifice test.
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These criticisms have merit and should be used to recognise the limits of the ToI.
Therefore, intent cannot be an indispensable prerequisite for finding an abuse. It should always be supported by a substantive test of exclusionary conduct. 194 It can be used as an analytical tool, contributing to the avoidance of false positives and false negatives. It covers some of the deficiencies of the other tests. 195 Moreover, intent could reasonably bridge the gap between detrimental effects and theories of consumer harm. 196 In addition, the element of intent should be taken into account to determine the gravity of the infringement when setting fines. 197 Given that, intent can play a key role in the application of Article 102.
E. CONCLUSION
Positive law does not provide a strict framework of the objectives of EUCL, thus creating a normative conundrum. Choosing and balancing among protection of freedom to compete,
preservation of an open and fair market, promoting innovation, industrial growth, welfare maximisation, consumers' protection and single market integration have caused a permanent concern for the CJEU. In a series of hard cases where the Court had to choose among conflicting goals, its findings have been unsatisfactory, or at least not widely accepted, thus undermining its legitimacy. Normative theories have striven for a long time to resolve this conundrum and subsequently facilitate the resolution of this adjudication problem.
The aim of this study was to assess whether the prevailing normative theories can in fact resolve the adjudication problem. It started with a critical evaluation of the two main normative approaches in EUCL. The various theories were categorised into two main approaches: the consequentialist and the deontological. The second substantive part examined whether the two main approaches can identify the underpinning rationale of Article 102 and explain CJEU jurisprudence. The purpose of this investigation was to assess whether the current normative approaches can elucidate
Article 102 and guide its interpretation. That being the case, these approaches would be able to resolve the adjudication problem concerning Article 102. Nonetheless, positive law and its application by the Court support the view that EUCL pursues a plethora of goals. A pluralistic perspective is further endorsed by the conclusion that the Court invokes deontological as well as consequentialist reasoning to deal with the disputes brought before it.
The third part focused on the three tests applied for finding an infringement of Article 102. Given that no single test is suitable for application to all conceivable abusive practices, a test-plurality has been increasingly appealing. Concluding that the holistic approaches cannot provide complete guidance in the interpretation and application of Article 102, the paper suggests that a first step towards a value pluralistic perspective of EUCL should be made.
Whether it can develop into a complete normative and adjudicative theory is to be appraised in the future.
